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2SUMMARY14
15
Prosociality can be defined as any behaviour performed to alleviate the needs of others or to16
improve their welfare. Prosociality has probably played an essential role in the evolution of17
cooperative behaviour and several studies have already investigated it in primates to understand18
the evolutionary origins of human prosociality. Two main tasks have been used to test19
prosociality in a food context. In the Platforms task, subjects can prosocially provide food to a20
partner by selecting a prosocial platform over a selfish one. In the Tokens task, subjects can21
prosocially provide food to a partner by selecting a prosocial token over a selfish one. As these22
tasks have provided mixed results, we used both tasks to test prosociality in great apes, capuchin23
monkeys, and spider monkeys. Our results provided no compelling evidence of prosociality in a24
food context in any of the species tested. Additionally, our study revealed serious limitations of25
the Tokens task as it has been previously used. These results highlight the importance of26
controlling for confounding variables and of using multiple tasks to address inconsistencies27
present in the literature.28
29
KEY INDEX WORDS: prosocial behaviour, primates, other-regarding preferences, apes,30
monkeys31
3INTRODUCTION32
Prosociality can be defined as any behaviour performed by one individual to alleviate the33
needs of other individuals or to improve their welfare, without the actor necessarily incurring in34
extra costs to provide these benefits [1]. In evolutionary terms, prosociality might have played an35
essential role in the evolution of mutually beneficial cooperative behaviour by providing36
individuals with the psychological predisposition to be concerned for the welfare of others (e.g.37
[2-4]; but see [5]). Although prosocial behaviour is well-documented among primates in feeding38
and agonistic contexts [e.g. 6-8], pinpointing the precise motivations underlying this behaviour39
has been difficult. Whereas several studies have reported chimpanzees helping others to obtain40
objects (including tools) in both mutualistic and altruistic settings [9-13], studies involving food41
distribution have produced mixed results [14-29].42
Two types of task (Platforms and Tokens) have commonly been used to measure43
primates’ prosocial tendency to give food to partners. In the Platforms task, subjects are44
presented with sliding platforms and two options (e.g. [14]). The subject always obtains the same45
amount of food regardless of the option chosen, but one of the options also provides food to the46
partner. By choosing this option the subject can therefore benefit a partner without incurring in47
any extra cost. Versions of this task have been used with several primate species. Chimpanzees48
(Pan troglodytes), for example, generally failed to give food to their partners [14-17]. In contrast,49
dominant long-tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) behaved prosocially toward subordinates50
[18]. However, the experimental set-up used in this last study makes the interpretation of the51
results not entirely straightforward because making a prosocial choice required the subject to sit52
closer to the partner, while making a non-prosocial choice required the subject to sit next to an53
empty room. It is conceivable that dominants might have preferred to sit next to the subordinate54
4(to elicit grooming), while subordinates might have avoided the dominant’s proximity (to avoid55
aggression). Further studies would be necessary to rule out this alternative interpretation.56
Tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus apella) also gave food to their partners in two57
independent studies [19-20]. Similarly, common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) prosocially and58
altruistically gave food to their partners [21]. Interestingly, cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus59
oedipus), despite also being a cooperative breeding species, did not prosocially provide food to60
other group members in two different studies [22-23]. Additionally, in a new version of this task,61
subjects could pull a platform to provide food rewards to all the other group members [24].62
Capuchin monkeys and Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) failed to be prosocial, but63
marmosets, again, gave food to their group members [24]. In general, subjects in the studies64
above did not make more prosocial choices when the partner showed interest in the food reward,65
by for example reaching out for it (chimpanzees [16], cotton-top tamarins [22], common66
marmosets [21]; see [25]), suggesting that subjects may not have been responding to the needs of67
their partner. Despite its frequent use, the Platforms task has been criticised, firstly for being too68
complex from a technical and a social perspective, and secondly for the presence of visible food69
rewards which may elicit selfish and competitive behaviour rather than prosocial attitudes ([26-70
27]; but see [16, 25])71
In the Tokens task, subjects learn to associate different stimuli with different food72
distribution outcomes (e.g., food for the partner versus food for nobody, food for both versus73
food for the subject). Then subjects have the opportunity to choose between stimuli, thus74
determining who will receive food. Chang and colleagues [28] trained rhesus macaques (Macaca75
mulatta) to associate unique visual cues with specific food distributions, and found that76
macaques preferred the prosocial visual stimulus (providing food to the partner) over the selfish77
5one (in this case, providing food to nobody). However, this preference did not hold when78
subjects also received food rewards (i.e. they did not prefer the stimulus providing food to the79
partner and the subject over the one providing food to the subject). These results do not allow us80
to draw definitive conclusions, as the number of subjects was too small. More importantly, this81
study cannot rule out that subjects were not behaving prosocially, but were simply preferring the82
prosocial option when receiving no food reward, as the prosocial option was the only one83
associated with food. De Waal and colleagues [29] trained female capuchin monkeys to84
discriminate between tokens providing food only to the subject and tokens providing food also to85
their partners. Subjects significantly preferred the prosocial token over the selfish one. Also86
female chimpanzees preferred the prosocial token when tested with a similar set-up [27]. These87
studies, however, are problematic because they failed to rule out alternative explanations. In the88
study by de Waal and colleagues [29], for example, there were no control conditions89
investigating the behaviour of capuchin monkeys when subjects were provided with the same90
two tokens, without a partner present in the adjacent cage. Without this control condition, it is91
impossible to know whether subjects’ choice reflected a prosocial tendency to give food to their92
partners, or a general preference for the choice associated with an overall higher amount of food93
rewards. Horner and colleagues [27] introduced no-partner control conditions, but they were94
always conducted after the experimental condition with the partner, and used different pairs of95
tokens to prevent subjects from learning that all tokens produced the same outcome. Therefore, it96
is impossible to rule out the possibility that the order in which conditions were administered and97
the type of tokens used affected the results. Moreover, both studies [27, 29] failed to test whether98
subjects understood the task. Only recently, Suchak and de Waal [30] introduced a condition to99
test subjects’ understanding of the task, as well as a no-partner control condition, but100
6unfortunately the no-partner control always took place after the experimental condition with the101
partner to try to avoid the expectation of receiving both rewards. Therefore, no definitive102
conclusions can be drawn from these studies.103
The main aim of this study was to use both the Platforms and the Tokens tasks to test104
prosociality in six primate species: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus),105
gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), orangutans (Pongo abelii), tufted capuchin monkeys and Geoffroyi’s106
spider monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi). Although prosociality has already been tested in some of107
these species, as far as we know, no previous study has investigated multiple species of monkeys108
and apes with the two most frequently used food providing prosociality tests. In the Platforms109
task, subjects could choose the prosocial platform over the selfish one to provide food to their110
partners, and in the Tokens task they could select a prosocial token over a selfish one to provide111
food to their partners. If the use of both tasks (with appropriate controls) on the same population112
leads to the same outcome, then results become more compelling. All the species included are113
good candidates for prosociality owing to their complex cognitive skills (great apes: [31]), high114
levels of allo-maternal care (capuchin monkeys, which might thus show enhanced motivation to115
be prosocial: [32-33]), and high levels of social tolerance (Pan, Pongo and spider monkeys:116
[34]).117
118
METHODS119
Subjects. We tested 7 spider monkeys (combined in 26 pairs) at the Animaya Zoo in120
Merida, Mexico, 10 tufted capuchin monkeys (combined in 18 pairs) at the ISTC-CNR Primate121
Centre in Rome, Italy, and 12 chimpanzees (combined in 34 pairs), 9 bonobos (combined in 26122
7pairs), 5 orangutans (combined in 18 pairs) and 7 gorillas (combined in 22 pairs) at the Wolfgang123
Koehler Primate Research Center in the Leipzig Zoo, Germany. Subjects were of both sexes and124
various age classes (adults, subadults and juveniles, according to [35-36]). They were all born in125
captivity, except for one gorilla (Bebe) and all the spider monkeys, who were born in the wild126
but were raised as pets before being rescued and brought to the zoo.127
Subjects were all housed in groups with their group members, in enclosures with outdoor128
and indoor areas, and they were never deprived of food or water before or during the experiment.129
All of them were used to being temporarily isolated in testing rooms (with their infant if present)130
and were tested by the same familiar experimenter only after they were comfortable with the set-131
up and the testing room. All subjects had previously participated in experimental tasks, but they132
had not been previously tested in the same tasks administered in this study, with the exception of133
six chimpanzees tested by Jensen and colleagues [15] with a task similar to the Platforms task134
(also see Table S1 in Electronic Supplementary Information). For different reasons, not all dyads135
could be tested with both tasks. Some subjects were moved to/from different facilities during the136
study, other subjects were not motivated to exchange tokens, or could not be paired with the137
same partner when the second experiment started because the quality of their relationship138
worsened for no reason the experimenters could discern. Importantly, only pairs with a good139
quality of relationship were included in this study, consequently enhancing the possibility to140
detect prosocial behaviour (see [1]). Quality of relationship was assessed by the keepers working141
at the different facilities, excluding pairs that would have shown distress if being tested in two142
adjacent rooms. Finally, spider monkeys were only tested with the Platforms task. They were the143
only species with no previous experience at exchanging tokens (see Table S1 in Electronic144
Supplementary Information) and time constraints meant that training was not possible.145
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PLATFORMS TASK.147
Materials and procedure. In this task, the subject was located in the testing room and148
faced an apparatus consisting of a table with three sliding platforms baited with different food149
rewards (Figure 1). Food rewards were out of the subject’s reach, but the subject could use150
handles to pull in two of the three platforms (the prosocial one, or P, and the selfish one, or S).151
After selecting either S or P by pulling the corresponding handle, the subject could reach the152
food on the chosen platform, while the other platform moved back, out of the subject’s reach.153
The third platform could be pulled by neither the subject nor the partner, but it was connected to154
P: if the subject pulled P, the third platform moved toward the adjacent room, where the food155
could be retrieved by the partner. If the subject selected S the third platform moved further away156
from the partner, who then received no food. In contrast to other studies [e.g. 14, 21], we did not157
use stacked platforms, and the third platform was physically separated from P and S. Each dyad158
received one training condition and three experimental conditions: Equal, Unequal and159
Equidistant (with three corresponding control conditions).160
In the Training condition the subject was tested alone. Sessions were alternated so that161
the subject had access exclusively to her testing room (and thus S and P), or also to the adjacent162
room (and thus also to the third platform). Each session was composed of 6 trials, in which only163
one of the 3 platforms was baited (randomising the order and baiting each platform twice in each164
session). Once the platforms were baited, the subject had 30 seconds to make a selection.165
Subjects were considered to have knowledge of the set-up and could therefore move to the166
following condition if (i) they always pulled S when S was baited and always pulled P when P167
9was baited in two consecutive sessions in which they had only access to S and P, and if (ii) they168
always pulled S when S was baited and P when P or the third platform were baited in two169
consecutive sessions in which they had access to all three platforms. Subjects required a mean of170
3.4 sessions (with 2 sessions being the minimal number of sessions required to master the171
Training condition) to advance to the next condition.172
In the Equal condition, the subject was in the testing room and the partner in the adjacent173
room. In full view of the subject, the Experimenter (E) baited all three platforms with an equal174
food reward (a slice of banana, a raisin or a pellet, depending on the subject’s preference). As175
soon as the last platform was positioned and baited, the subject had 30 seconds to select one of176
the two platforms (the prosocial one, P, or the selfish one, S) by pulling it and retrieving the177
food. In this condition, subjects had therefore to get closer to their partner to make the prosocial178
choice, something that we controlled for in the Equidistant condition (see below). In the179
corresponding control condition, the subject was in the testing room and the partner in a room180
other than the adjacent one, which was empty and visible to the subject. E followed exactly the181
same procedure as before, but when the subject pulled P, E retrieved the food on the third182
platform and put it back in the food bucket.183
In the Unequal and Equidistant conditions, E followed exactly the same procedure as the184
Equal condition, with the exception that (i) in the Unequal condition the third platform was185
baited with 3 food rewards instead of one, and (ii) in the Equidistant condition the handles of S186
and P did not point straight to the subject, but 45 degrees toward each other, so that the subject187
did not have to get closer to the partner’s adjacent room in order to pull P. The Unequal188
condition allowed us to understand whether prosocial choices were facilitated by an189
equal/unequal food distribution between subject and partner. The Equidistant condition, instead,190
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allowed us to control whether prosocial/selfish choices depended on whether the subject191
preferred to approach or to avoid the side of the partner’s room. The corresponding control192
conditions were identical, but the partner was in a room other than the adjacent one, which was193
empty and visible to the subject, and E retrieved the food on the third platform and put it back in194
the food bucket in case the subject chose P.195
After mastering the Training, dyads were administered the Equal condition (randomising196
the order in which the three experimental and the three control sessions were administered),197
followed by the Unequal condition (randomizing the order of the three experimental and control198
sessions), and by the Equidistant condition (with half of the subjects starting with the199
experimental and half with the control session). In all conditions, sessions consisted of 12 trials.200
The inclusion of the three conditions allowed us to explore the potential effects of food201
inequality and inter-individual distance when making choices.202
203
TOKENS TASK.204
Materials and procedure. Each subject was tested with up to three partners, and with205
each partner a different pair of tokens was used (see Table S1 in Electronic Supplementary206
Information). Great apes were tested with the same three pairs of tokens, while capuchin207
monkeys were tested with three different pairs of tokens, to ensure that no species was tested208
with tokens similar to those already used in the past. Tokens were little Plexiglas cylinders or209
cuboids (approximately 4-6 cm in size) painted in different colours. If subjects were paired with210
more than one partner, a different pair of tokens was used for each of the partners. Following211
Horner and colleagues [27], subjects were tested with a second partner only after all the212
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conditions with the first partner had been run, and only after subject and partner had also213
switched their roles (if this dyad was also planned). For each dyad, we administered five214
conditions.215
Unless otherwise stated, we followed the procedure by Horner and colleagues [27]. In the216
Preference condition, we tested whether subjects preferred one of the two tokens, in each pair217
they had been assigned. Subjects were tested alone and underwent one session of 10 trials. In218
each trial, subjects were presented with the two different tokens and could choose one of the two219
by pointing or trying to reach for it. The position of the tokens (right/left) was randomized and220
counterbalanced across trials. Regardless of the choice made, subjects were rewarded with one221
pellet wrapped in paper. In this task, food rewards were always wrapped in paper so that subjects222
were not distracted by visible food and could rely on both sound and sight to know whether the223
partner had been rewarded, as unwrapping the paper made noise and attracted the subject’s224
attention (see [27]). Subjects were considered to have a token preference when one of the two225
tokens was selected in ≥80% of the trials. As this only happened in 4 out of 55 dyads, and in 226
each case the preferred token was a different one, we did not change any pair of tokens, as done227
in [27, 29].228
In the Training condition, one of the two tokens within each pair was considered the229
prosocial token (P) and the other one the selfish token (S). For each species, the same token was230
considered to be P in approximately half of the dyads tested with that pair of tokens, and it was231
considered to be S in the other half of the dyads, to avoid that our results were affected by any232
intrinsic token properties. The Training condition consisted of one session of 10 trials. In this233
condition, the subject was in the testing room and the partner in an adjacent room. In each trial,234
the Experimenter (E) placed one of the two tokens in a bin hanging in the subject’s room. The235
12
tokens were randomized and counterbalanced across trials, so that the same token was not given236
more than three times in a row. After the token was placed in the bin, E asked the subject to give237
it back. The subject had 4 minutes to hand it back to E, who then placed it in a visible position238
between the subject and the partner. If E received P, E took two food rewards from a bucket,239
held them up briefly, one in each hand, to make them visible to the subject and partner, and then240
gave one food reward to the subject and then one to the partner. If E received S, E took one food241
reward from the bucket, held it briefly in one hand to make it visible to the subject and partner,242
and then only rewarded the subject. Food rewards were always wrapped in paper. By the end of243
this condition, subjects and partners had experienced 5 trials with a selfish outcome and 5 trials244
with a prosocial one.245
In the Experimental condition, as in the Training, the subject was in the testing room and246
the partner in an adjacent room. This condition consisted of one session of 30 trials. At the247
beginning of the session, E placed 15 S and 15 P tokens in the bin and then asked the subject to248
hand one back within 4 minutes. E placed the returned token in a visible place between the249
subject and the partner, before rewarding them with wrapped food rewards like in the Training250
condition. At the end of the trial, E placed back the token in the bin and started another trial. If251
subjects did not give back any token, the session was interrupted and continued on the next252
possible day. If subjects selected more than one token from the bin, each returned token was253
considered as a choice, tokens were rewarded sequentially, with each token displayed only as the254
appropriate reward was offered, and all the tokens were placed back together in the bin.255
In the Control condition, the subject was in the testing room but the partner was in256
another non-adjacent room (so that the adjacent room was visibly empty to the subject). E257
followed exactly the same procedure of the Experimental condition, but when she was given the258
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prosocial token P, E rewarded the subject and then pretended to reward a partner in the adjacent259
testing room, which was empty, by pretending to put the wrapped food reward through the mesh,260
hiding it in the hand and eventually placing it back in the bucket out of the subject’s view (see261
[27]). In contrast to the study from Horner and colleagues [27], dyads were tested with the same262
pair of tokens as in the Experimental condition, in order to rule out the possibility that different263
performance across conditions might depend on the different pair of tokens used. Also differing264
from Horner and colleagues [27], subjects did not always run the Control condition after the265
Experimental condition. After completing the Preference and Training conditions, instead, half266
of the subjects underwent the Experimental before the Control condition, and half of the subjects267
underwent the Control condition before the Experimental one (see Table S1 in Electronic268
Supplementary Information). In this way, we ensured that the order in which conditions were269
administered could not account for any differences in performance between the two conditions.270
In the Solitary condition, the subject was in the testing room but also had access to the271
adjacent room. E followed the same procedure of the Experimental condition, but when the272
subject gave her P back, E placed the second wrapped food reward in the adjacent testing room,273
so that the subject could obtain it by simply moving to that room. If subjects had knowledge of274
the set-up, they should select P significantly more than chance to obtain double the amount of275
food. This condition was always administered after the Experimental and Control conditions, to276
avoid subjects expecting both rewards in all conditions and thus fostering competitive attitudes277
and hindering prosocial behaviour in the Experimental condition [27].278
Scoring and data analysis. In each condition of the two tasks, E coded live whether279
subjects selected the prosocial (P) or the selfish (S) platform or token. We videotaped all the280
trials (1.7% of the trials were not recorded due to technical problems) and later checked the live-281
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scored behaviour against the videotapes for accuracy. The videos are digitally archived at the282
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig and are available on request. A283
second observer coded 19% of all the trials performed (3589/18984 trials in the Platforms task,284
and 983/4950 trials in the Tokens task) to assess the inter-observer reliability, which was very285
good (Cohen’s k = 0.94 in both cases).286
In both tasks, our dependent variable was the percentage of P choices. Non-parametric287
Wilcoxon tests were used to compare performance between conditions (for all species and for288
each species separately). In the Tokens task, we repeated our analyses only including those dyads289
in which the Experimental condition was performed before the Control condition (as in [27]), in290
order to assess the impact of condition order on the subjects’ performance. Additionally, we used291
binomial tests to investigate subjects’ knowledge of the set-up, by analysing whether subjects292
selected P significantly more than chance in the Solitary condition, for each dyad separately.293
When this was the case, Wilcoxon tests for each dyad were run to compare performance between294
Experimental and Control conditions. No analyses were done for the Training condition in the295
Platforms task, as almost all subjects immediately mastered the task and could move to the296
following condition. All tests were exact and two-tailed, and α level was set at .05. However, 297
when analyses were conducted separately for each dyad, Bonferroni-Holm corrections were298
added to control for multiple comparisons. Finally, to control that our conclusions were robust299
to different forms of analyses, we also repeated our analyses using linear mixed models, which300
provided the same results (see Electronic Supplementary Information).301
302
RESULTS303
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PLATFORMS TASK304
Overall subjects did not choose the prosocial platform (P) significantly more often in the305
Experimental than in the Control sessions. In fact, they selected P more often in the Control than306
in the Experimental sessions in the Equal condition (n = 52, T = 2915, p = 0.031; P choices in307
Experimental: 27.0%) and in the Unequal condition (n = 62, T = 2881, p = 0.004; P choices in308
Experimental: 24.0%), but showed no significant preference in the Equidistant condition (n = 37,309
T = 1195, p = 0.201; P choices in Experimental: 22.9%).310
Analysing each species separately in the Equal condition revealed that orangutans,311
capuchin monkeys and spider monkeys selected P more often in the Control than in the312
Experimental sessions (orangutans: n = 11, T = 95.5, p = 0.043; capuchin monkeys: n = 10, T =313
96.5, p = 0.037; spider monkeys: n = 16, T = 224, p = 0.033; Figure 2a). In contrast, gorillas314
selected P more often in Experimental than Control sessions (n = 10, T = 55.5, p = 0.048).315
Neither chimpanzees nor bonobos showed a significant difference between conditions316
(chimpanzees: n = 10, T = 120, p = 0.326; bonobos: n = 8, T = 52, p = 0.334).317
In the Unequal condition, chimpanzees and spider monkeys selected P more often in the318
Control than in the Experimental sessions (chimpanzees: n = 15, T = 176, p = 0.006; spider319
monkeys: n = 19, T = 262.5, p = 0.006). All other species showed no significant difference320
between conditions in their choice of P (bonobos: n = 9, T = 70, p = 0.094; gorillas: n = 9, T =321
59, p = 0.124; orangutans: n = 7, T = 29, p = 0.117; capuchin monkeys: n = 8, T = 66, p = 0.419;322
Figure 2b).323
Finally, in the Equidistant condition no species selected P more often in one condition324
than the other (chimpanzees: n = 7, T = 56, p = 0.480; bonobos: n = 4, T = 11, p = 0.375;325
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gorillas: n = 8, T = 48, p = 0.194; orangutans: n = 4, T = 14, p = 0.563; capuchin monkeys: n = 6,326
T = 40, p = 0.571; spider monkeys: n = 13, T = 106, p = 0.165; Figure 2c). Bonobos were the327
only species that selected P more often in the Experimental than in the Control sessions, in all328
conditions, but this difference was never significant.329
330
TOKENS TASK331
Overall subjects did not choose the prosocial token (P) significantly more often in the332
Experimental over the Control condition (n = 26, T = 564, p = 0.801; P choices in Experimental:333
49.5%). This was true also when analysing each species separately (chimpanzees: n = 8, T = 74,334
p = 0.445; bonobos: n = 7, T = 29.5, p = 0.422; gorillas: n = 6, T = 23, p = 0.156; orangutans: n =335
4, T = 15, p = 0.953; capuchin monkeys: n = 6, T = 24.5, p = 0.414; Figure 3).336
However, subjects that received the Experimental before the Control condition selected P337
significantly more often in the Experimental over the Control condition (n = 16, T = 187.5, p =338
0.046; P choices in Experimental: 56.2%).339
Crucially, subjects selected P at chance levels in the Solitary condition (n = 31, T =340
803.5, p = 0.300; P choices in Solitary: 43.8%). This was also true when analysing each species341
separately (chimpanzees: n = 10, T = 106.5, p = 0.374; bonobos: n = 6, T = 41, p = 0.894;342
gorillas: n = 6, T = 30.5, p = 0.094; orangutans: n = 5, T = 16, p = 0.313; capuchin monkeys: n =343
6, T = 31, p = 0.086; Figure 3). When separately analysing each of the 55 dyads, however, 10344
subjects chose P significantly more often than expected by chance in the Solitary condition.345
Within these dyads, however, none of the subjects chose P significantly more in the346
Experimental than in the Control condition (Table 1).347
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DISCUSSION349
Overall, our results provided no compelling evidence of prosocial behaviour in any of the350
primate species tested with the two different tasks. None of the species, regardless of their socio-351
ecological characteristics and cognitive capacities, showed a consistent preference for selecting352
the prosocial option when a partner was present (Experimental sessions) compared to when the353
partner was absent (Control condition). In the Equal condition of the Platforms task, no species354
but gorillas chose the prosocial option significantly more in the Experimental than in the Control355
condition. However, gorillas’ preference for the prosocial option in the presence of conspecifics356
was not replicated in any other condition. It is therefore difficult to conclude that gorillas were357
behaving prosocially towards their conspecifics. In the Unequal condition, no species showed358
evidence of prosocial behaviour, although the lack of prosocial behaviour might have been a359
consequence of an aversion to disadvantageous inequity (e.g. [37-38]; but see [19]). Finally, no360
species showed prosocial behaviour in the Equidistant condition. These results are consistent361
with previous studies that failed to detect prosocial behaviour in chimpanzees using a similar362
task [14-17].363
Our results contrast with studies showing prosocial behaviour in capuchin monkeys364
tested with the Platforms task [19-20]. One reason why results may differ for capuchin monkeys365
is that a high variability might exist across populations in terms of prosociality and other366
behaviours potentially linked to prosociality, like social tolerance. One might speculate that the367
capuchin monkeys tested in our study were less socially tolerant than other capuchin monkey368
populations [e.g. 39], and might therefore fail to behave prosocially towards each other (see [34]369
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for a test of social tolerance including some of the same individuals). This explanation, however,370
is weakened by the fact that in our study we only tested tolerant dyads (see material and371
methods). Moreover, even species showing high social tolerance levels in [34] showed no372
evidence of prosociality in the present study. Unfortunately, no data are currently available373
comparing the levels of social tolerance across different populations of capuchin monkeys. This374
means that explaining our findings in terms of a lack of social tolerance in the tested populations375
is conceivable, but it awaits empirical verification.376
Our results extend previous findings on chimpanzees to other primate species, suggesting377
that prosocial behaviour as assessed with food tasks may not be a robust phenomenon, although378
groups and/or populations might differ in their levels of prosociality, as mentioned above. One379
surprising finding was that some species were not simply indifferent to the partner in the380
Platforms task, but made even fewer prosocial choices when the partner was present. In the381
Equal condition, orangutans, capuchin monkeys, and spider monkeys preferred the prosocial382
option less often when their partner was present than when absent, and the same was true for383
chimpanzees and spider monkeys in the Unequal condition. Although these differences were not384
fully consistent across conditions and not present for each species, one could argue that some385
species behaved antisocially towards their group members. Alternatively, these species might386
simply be more reluctant to approach the partner in the testing situation. Recall that in both the387
Equal and Unequal conditions, subjects had to get closer to the partner to make the prosocial388
choice. In these conditions, therefore, subjects might have failed to behave prosocially simply to389
avoid approaching the partner. In line with this interpretation, all species ceased being antisocial390
in the Equidistant condition (i.e. they became indifferent), when subjects did not need to get391
closer to the partner to select the prosocial option. Therefore partner’s proximity is an important392
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factor to consider not only when studying prosociality, but also in social competition tasks [e.g.393
40]. Consequently, the stacked platforms set-up [e.g. 14, 21, 41] seems a better option to study394
food-distribution-based prosociality than the side-by-side set-up used in our study. Note,395
however, that even in the Equidistant condition, no species was prosocial, which means that lack396
of prosociality in our Platforms task cannot be entirely ascribed to our set-up.397
Prosocial behaviour was not elicited by the Tokens task either. In contrast to previous398
studies highlighting the advantages of this procedure [27, 29, 30], our study revealed several399
important limitations, at least in the way that this procedure has been used so far. The most400
important limitation was that the vast majority of the subjects failed to understand the401
contingencies governing the task, in contrast to what happened in the Platforms task, where402
subjects mastered the procedure after a mean of only 3.4 sessions. This was clearly evidenced by403
the fact that 45 out of 55 dyads having access to both testing rooms (Solitary condition) failed to404
select the prosocial token significantly above chance level, thus missing the opportunity to405
double the amount of food obtained. Moreover, none of the subjects of these remaining 10 dyads406
that selected the prosocial token significantly more often than chance in the Solitary condition407
chose the prosocial option significantly more often when the partner was present. In short, most408
of the subjects did not understand the task, and those who did showed no evidence of prosocial409
behaviour. Note that exchanging objects for food per se was not the problem here. Following410
previous studies [27, 29, 30], we did not train subjects to reach a criterion. However, most of the411
subjects and species included in our study had already exchanged objects for food in previous412
studies [e.g., 42-46] and all subjects readily exchanged tokens in the current study (see Table S1413
in Electronic Supplementary Information). In retrospect, our results highlight the importance of414
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assessing whether the subjects understand the task before drawing conclusions from the resulting415
data.416
Our study also demonstrated that the order in which conditions are administered417
significantly affects the results. Although subjects did not select the prosocial token more often418
when a partner was present as opposed to absent, such a preference was detected when analysing419
only the dyads in which the Experimental condition (partner present) was administered before420
the Control condition (partner absent). Randomizing the order of conditions is therefore essential421
to obtain unbiased data on prosocial behaviour, something that previous studies did not fully422
achieve.423
Our results based on two tasks contrast with those previously reported for capuchin424
monkeys [29, 30] and chimpanzees [27]. However, the caveats that we have identified above425
require that those results are interpreted with great caution. In particular, we still failed to obtain426
consistent evidence of prosocial behaviour in the tested species, despite our best attempts of427
eliciting prosocial behaviour, for instance by following Horner and colleagues’ [27] procedure428
and ensuring the inclusion of all their procedural improvements (e.g. use of wrapped food429
rewards not to distract subjects with visible food, use of transparent panels or mesh between430
subject and partner to allow communication, avoidance of competitive attitudes by always431
allowing them access to the partner’s room in the Solitary condition only after administering the432
Experimental condition).433
Finally, since de Waal and colleagues [29] and Horner and colleagues [27] only tested434
females, one could argue that sex differences could explain the discrepancies between the current435
and previous studies. However, none of the females who responded appropriately in the Solitary436
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condition of the Tokens task behaved prosocially towards their partners. This means that the437
inclusion of males in our sample cannot explain the differences with previous studies. Although438
our findings with the Tokens task contrast with those in the three studies that have so far been439
done with the same task, our results are quite consistent with the data from the Platforms task.440
In conclusion, the results of both the Platforms and the Tokens tasks (with their441
respective control conditions) did not provide compelling evidence of prosocial behaviour for442
any of the six primate species tested. When food distribution was involved, great apes, spider443
monkeys, and capuchin monkeys failed to show prosocial behaviour toward group members,444
despite being paired with different partners and having the chance to provide them with food at445
no extra cost to themselves. These results highlight the importance of implementing tasks that446
control for confounding variables and of using different experimental paradigms when previous447
results contradict one another. Although it is still possible that other populations perform448
differently when tested with the same task (because of differences in diet quality, housing, or449
personality, for example [47]), administering multiple tasks (with control conditions) is450
necessary to demonstrate prosociality. Finally, it is important to stress that our conclusions are451
limited to prosocial behaviour in an active food distribution context and do not allow us to452
generalise our findings to other contexts, like helping behaviour [e.g. 9-13] or passive food453
transfers [e.g. 7-8], as prosocial behaviour might be restricted to specific contexts and not454
generalize to active food-sharing [10].455
456
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TABLE AND FIGURE CAPTIONS579
580
TABLE 1. For each species, list of the dyads in which the subject chose the prosocial token581
significantly more than chance in the Solitary condition of the Tokens task (Binomial test), with582
the percentage of prosocial choices made, the P values for the Binomial test, and the results for583
the Wilcoxon test when comparing the subject’s percentage of prosocial choices in the584
Experimental and Control conditions.585
586
FIGURE 1. Set-up in the three conditions of the Platforms task.587
588
FIGURE 2. Mean percentage of prosocial choices (+SE) in the (a) Equal condition, (b) Unequal589
condition and (c) Equidistant condition of the Platforms task, as a function of species. Only590
gorillas made the prosocial choice significantly more in the Experimental than in the Control591
Equal condition (p = 0.048). The black line represents chance performance (at 50%).592
593
FIGURE 3. Mean percentage of prosocial choices (+SE) in the Experimental, Control and594
Solitary conditions of the Tokens task, as a function of species. The black line represents chance595
performance (at 50%).596
